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DUE PROCESS IN PAROLE GRANTING:
A CURRENT ASSESSMENT
by FRANK S. MERRrrT*t
INTRODUCTION

Parole, which has become an accepted feature of the American correctional system over the last sixty years, is the conditional release of an individual into the community under supervision after a period of incarceration.' It is a bifurcated process,
characterized initially by the decision to release on parole and
2
The decision to resubsequently by community supervision.
lease on parole, which is the primary concern of this article,
consists predominantly of the parole release hearing, perhaps the
3
most important stage in the entire corrections process.
The decision by the parole board to grant or deny parole is,
4
of course, incredibly important to the inmate. Yet, despite the
fact that parole boards are the arbiters of such monumental
decisions, they have been characterized by the corrections profession as "largely uncontrolled by legal standards, protections,
'5
or remedies."
* General Counsel, Prisoners Legal Assistance and Visiting Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, University of Illinois, Chicago Circle Campus; B.A. Hiram College (1966); J.D. Case Western Reserve University (1968).
f The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Howard C.
Eglit, Associate Professor of Law, IIT-Chicago-Kent School of Law,
through his brief on behalf of the A.C.L.U. in United States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff, 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975) which provided the ideas
for some portions of the article.
1. For a discussion of the history of parole see S. RUBIN, THE LAW
OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 620-22 (2d ed. 1973).

2. The parole release decision, rather than community supervision,
is the primary function of the parole board. Supervision of the individuals admitted to parole is undertaken by parole officers who frequently are not under the control of the parole authority.
3. See generally Kastenmeier & Eglit, Parole Release Decision-Makking: Rehabilitation,Expertise, and the Demise of Mythology, 22 AMER.
U.L. REV. 477 (1973).
4. Release on parole is the first opportunity which most incarcerated
felons have for release from the institution. As a consequence, parole
can and does coerce individuals into behavior which they would not otherwise undertake. Cf. N. MoRRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 12-20
(1974). The importance of the parole release decision in the minds of
inmates is demonstrated by the fact that it is the subject of numerous
inmate complaints. D. FOGEL, WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF 301-03 (1975);
INSIDE PRISON AMERICAN STYLE 157-93 (J. Minton, Jr. ed. 1971); L. ORSee also ATLAND, PRISONS: HOUSES OF DARKNESS 129, 134-36 (1975).
TICA: THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMM'N

ON ATTICA 97 (Bantam ed. 1972).
5. THE AMERICAN

CORRECTIONAL ASS'N, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL

STANDARDS 279 (3d ed. 1966). See also Hearings on H.R. 13118 Before
a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,
ser. 15, pt. 7A, at 235-36, 501 (1972).
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Few cases afford a glimpse of the decision-making processes of parole authorities. In those few cases where such a
glimpse has been afforded, examples of inaccurate or misleading
data being utilized by the parole authority in making its parole
release decision have been found. 6 In addition, parole boards
have been found to be employing data which is constitutionally
infirm. 7 In at least one case, it was seriously contended that the
parole board was considering the religion of the inmate in
determining whether to grant parole." Another case suggested
that parole was being employed to reward those who pleaded
guilty and to punish those who elected to exercise their constitutional right to stand trial."
Perhaps the most blatant example of infringement of constitutional rights by a parole board was the rule adopted by the

Tennessee Parole Board denying parole to anyone who filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts collaterally attacking his sentence. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit had little difficulty in striking this rule as violative of the
inmate's right of access to the courts. 10 Had this been an
unwritten policy rather than a written rule, the absence of
written decisions and other procedural due process safeguards
might well have made it impossible to prove the existence of the
policy absent an outright admission by the members of the
parole board. 1
6. See Calabro v. United States Bd. of Parole, 525 F.2d 660 (5th
Cir. 1975); Billiteri v. United States Bd. of Parole, 385 F. Supp. 1217
(W.D.N.Y. 1974) and 391 F. Supp. 260 (W.D.N.Y. 1975); Masiello v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 1133 (D. Conn. 1973). Cf. Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d
1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Franklin v. Shields, 399 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Va.
1975); Morris v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Va. 1975); United
States v. Mackey, 387 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Nev. 1975).
7. See Leonard v. Mississippi State Probation & Parole Bd., 509 F.2d
820 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 428 (1975); Wren v. United States.
Bd. of Parole, 389 F. Supp. 938 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
8. Farries v. United States Bd. of Parole, 484 F.2d 948 (7th Cir.
1973).
9. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of New York State
Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 931 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 419 U.S. 1015
(1974). In Smith v. North Carolina, 528 F.2d 807 (4th Cir. 1975), the
court determined that the inmate had been denied parole because he had
successfully challenged the failure to credit his sentence with the time
he had spent in custody prior to trial. The court found that this failure
to release the individual constituted an infringement of his right of access to the courts and therefore ordered Smith's immediate release on
parole.
10. Smartt v. Avery, 370 F.2d 788 (6th Cir. 1967).
11. This problem should be particularly borne in mind when weighing the competing interests to determine what process is required by
due process. If the procedure is too rudimentary, it will not catch any
but the most blatant use of inappropriate factors or data in reaching
a parole decision. The problem demonstrates what value there is in the
unorthodox approach to due process which looks to the potentiality of

error rather than the nature of the interest. See note 22 and accompanying text infra.
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Parole boards make mistakes 12 and parole board members
have biases and prejudices which are difficult to put aside in
reaching a decision whether to grant parole. 13 The fact that
such mistakes do occur and that such biases are present supports
the need for some reasonable procedures to minimize the effects
of bias and to lessen the possibility of error. This article, after
providing a brief synopsis of the protective developments which
have been incorporated into the entire parole procedure, will
suggest various means by which the "parole release decision"
may be improved in order to ensure a fair and swift parole
disposition.
THE APPLICATION OF DUE PROCESS TO PAROLE BOARD DECISIONS

Prior to the leading case of Morrissey v. Brewer,14 it was
generally accepted that the actions of a parole authority in
granting, denying or revoking parole were not reviewable. 15
Most courts accepted the proposition that the determination
whether to grant or deny parole was wholly within the discretion
of the parole board and could only be reviewed for an abuse of
discretion."' These decisions, which did not distinguish between parole granting and parole revocation, were cast in doubt,
however, by Morrissey which held that procedural due process was applicable to the parole revocation process. The determination in Morrissey that parole revocation decisions were
not only reviewable but also subject to procedural due process,
seriously undercut the basis upon which the lower courts had
refused to review parole granting decisions.
One of the persistent questions concerning the granting of
parole has been whether any procedural rights are to be accorded the individual being considered for parole under the due
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The
failure to accord any due process rights in parole proceedings,
prior to the Morrissey decision, was predicated upon the belief
that parole was a "privilege";' 7 consequently, due process con12. See Hearings on H.R. 13118 Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 15, pt. 7A, at 263-76,
451 (1972).

13. See Oswald, Decisions! Decisions! Decisions!, 34 FED. PROBATION
27 (March 1970); Thomas, An Analysis of Parole Selection, 9 CRIME &
DEL. 173, 175-76 (1963).

14. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).

15. See Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970); Rose v.

Haskins, 388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968); Hyser
v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
16. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Campbell v. Pate, 401 F.2d 55 (7th
Cir. 1968); Palermo v. Rockefeller, 323 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
17. Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 408 n.3 (2d Cir. 1970).
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siderations did not appertain. Since the state was not required
to grant parole to an inmate, when it did so it was not required
to grant the individual fourteenth amendment due process
rights. Immediately preceeding Morrissey, however, the Supreme Court sounded the death knell to the "right-privilege
dichotomy." No longer were due process safeguards contingent
upon whether the transaction involved was traditionally classified a right or privilege.1 8
Morrissey dealt only with the application of due process to
parole revocation, and did not purport to discuss the application
of procedural due process to the granting of parole. However,
to attempt to distinguish Morrissey from the parole granting
setting on the basis that the individual on parole possesses a
conditional freedom while the individual being considered for
parole is only attempting to gain the status of conditional release, is merely to attempt a reincarnation of the right-privilege
dichotomy in a not too deceptive disguise. To date the courts
have, on the whole, rejected that distinction as a basis for refusing to extend due process to parole granting. 19
While there is no "right" to be paroled, it is clear that the
parole board holds the key to an inmate's conditional freedom.
Clearly, the determination of whether an inmate has met the
criteria established for his conditional release is discretionary.
The discretion exercised in such a situation can be analogized to
the discretion invoked by the state in granting various licenses.
For example, an individual is not entitled to a liquor license or
an apartment in public housing, yet he is entitled to fair consideration of his application for either of these and the Constitution
guarantees him such due process as is necessary to ensure the
Similarly, no individual has a
fairness of these considerations.2
right to a license to practice law, yet it is clear that any individual desiring such a license has a right to due process in the
consideration of his application. 2'
The Supreme Court, in Morrissey, established that the
critical factor in determining the applicability of due process is
whether the party involved would be subjected to a "grievous
loss" with regard to a protected interest. 2 In determining this
18. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Lynch v.
Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
19. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of New York
State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 927-28 n.2 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot,
419 U.S. 1015 (1974).
20. Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d
Cir. 1968); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
21. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
22. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); See Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). The Supreme Court, in Meachum v. Fano, 19 CRIM. L. RPm.
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the court must ascertain whether the individual's interest in
avoiding the unfavorable action outweighs the governmental
23
interest in summary adjudication.
In Morrissey, the Court determined that an individual suffers a grievous loss when his parole is revoked. The individual
being considered for parole is not attempting to maintain his
freedom, but is attempting to gain his conditional liberty and
3167 (U.S. June 25, 1976), reemphasized the fact that the interest involved must be one protected by the due process clause.
A second, although unorthodox analysis, can also be applied in determining whether due process appertains in any given situation. The first
step in employing this approach is to determine whether there is a need
to provide some procedural assurance of a correct result by determining
the likelihood of any erroneous result. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 171-203 (1974) (White, J., concurring) (in shaping rules of procedure
the courts are to be guided by risks of error). The question of potential
error in any transaction does not really go to the individual's interest,
rather it works to reinforce or justify the result reached by balancing
the individual's interest against the state's interest. Thus, in Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the petitioner's real interest was in obtaining money through welfare to purchase food. The question of the harm
which would be visited by an erroneous termination of welfare is simply
a reinforcement of the decision which could be reached by balancing
the interests without considering the risk of error or the resulting harm.
Similarly, in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), the
strong interest that an individual has in the availability of his personal
funds to pay his debts would be sufficient to support the requirement
of notice and a hearing prior to any garnishment of wages, without consideration of the risk of error in such proceedings, although the risk of
error and potential harm certainly support the result.
In the orthodox, or grievous loss approach, a review of the possibilities of an erroneous result may be employed, as a secondary rationale,
after it has been determined that the transaction involves a grievous loss.
The basic difference between the orthodox approach and the unorthodox
approach is that the first employs three distinct steps. It requires that
there be a life, liberty or property interest protected by due process;
second, the action must visit a grievous loss; third, the individual's
and state's interests must be balanced to determine what process, if any,
is due. The unorthodox approach, on the other hand, assumes that the
drafters of the Bill of Rights intended to cover all possible interests in
the phrase "life, liberty or property." In determining the procedure to
be required, the unorthodox approach then looks to the risk of error and
weighs the interests to determine the procedure to be required, if any.
The purpose to be served through the imposition of procedural due
process strictures on any governmental decision-making process is to assure that the decision is rational and fair. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). Thus, it can be suggested that
procedural due process is nothing more than those collective processes
which the law requires to assure a result which comports with substantive due process. For example, there is difficulty in determining whether
the setting aside of a decision for a total absence of evidence is a violation of substantive due process or procedural due process. See Douglas
v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430 (1973); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961);
Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960); Caton v. Smith,
486 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1973). While the Supreme Court seems firmly
committed to the grievous loss approach, see Meachum v. Fano, 19 CRIM.
L. RPTR. 3167 (U.S. June 25, 1976), the unorthodox approach commends
itself because it goes far to obliterate any sharp distinction between substantive due process and procedural due process while retaining considerable flexibility in the particular procedures to be required to assure
fairness.
23. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970).
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thus also has a strong interest in being assured that the decision
is neither arbitrary nor based on erroneous information. While
the denial of release on this conditional liberty is not as great a
loss as the loss of such conditional liberty once granted, it is nevand thus
ertheless the denial of freedom from incarceration,
24
could certainly be considered a grievous loss.

In weighing the interests involved, both the state and the
individual have strong interests to be served through the injection of some due process controls into the parole release decisional process which would clearly appear to outweigh the state's
competing interest in a prompt and summary administrative
proceeding. The state has no interest in having an individual
arbitrarily denied parole; incarceration is costly to the state.
First, there is the economic and social cost of maintaining the
individual within the correctional institution. 25 Second, the economic and social benefit to the community, which the individual
26
would contribute were he free in the community, is lost.

Fur-

24. This conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court's decision in
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), where the Court determined
that major discipline within a correctional institution (placement in solitary confinement or segregation or loss of accumulated good time) constituted a grievous loss entitling the inmate to some procedural due process protections. This conclusion was premised, in part, upon the effects
that these actions had upon the inmates' chances of release on parole.
See also Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270, 1278 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
25. There are at least three costs involved in incarcerating an individual. These are the loss of the income which the individual would
have made, the costs of supporting any individuals who are economically
dependent upon the inmate and the actual cost of keeping him in prison.
Data demonstrating this last cost is available. The following table demonstrates the costs of maintaining an individual in prison on a yearly
basis.
Cost Per
Cost Of
Prison
Inmate Per Yr.***
Operating Inst.* *
Population*
State
$ 8,981.20
$ 152,410,000
16,970
California
8,978.51
50,549,000
5,630
Illinois
4,725.42
40,029,000
8,471
Michigan
22,148.17
41,107,000
1,856
Massachusetts
9,870.35
115,414,000
11,693
New York
8,224.99
68,070,000
8,276
Ohio
2,301.36
36,152,'000
15,709
Texas

1,139,419,000
196,183
United States**
* Actual population as of December 31, 1972.
FORCEMENT

ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION,

PRISONERS

5,575.85
Source: LAW

IN

STATE AND

ENFED-

ERAL INSTITUTIONS ON DECEMBER 31, 1971, 1972, AND 1973 (National Prisoner Statistics Bulletin No. SD-NPS-PSF-1, 1975).
* * Source: U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE

ADMINISTRATION,

EXPENDITURE

AND EMPLOYMENT

DATA

FOR

THE

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1972-73, at 266 (1975).
* * * Since the expenditures are for the fiscal year of the particular
state, while the population figures represent the population of a particular day rather than the average population during the budget period, the
result may be slightly distorted.
* * * * Total of both state and federal governments.
26. For a discussion of the social costs of imprisonment to the community and the benefits to the community from permitting the offender
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ther, if the need for imprisonment has ceased (signified by the
determination that the individual should be paroled) then the interest of society which caused the individual to be imprisoned has
27
ceased.
Since the decision in Morrissey, a number of courts have
been called upon to consider whether the denial of parole constitutes a grievous loss. The majority of these courts have determined that it does and that due process appertains in the parole
granting process. 28 Pressed by these decisions and other critics, 219 the United States Board of Parole has adopted extensive
these regregulations structuring the exercise of its discretion;30
3
ulations, in turn, have been partially codified. '
WHAT PROCESS Is DUE?

With the determination that procedural due process appertains in the parole granting process, it is necessary to determine
what procedures are constitutionally required. The procedures
to be required must be sufficient to minimize the perceived
abuses of discretion without imposing unnecessary restraints
upon the paroling authority. The authority should not be burdened with unnecessary or excessive procedural processes which
do not significantly improve the quality of the decision.
to remain in the community, see generally

CORRECTIONAL ECONOMICS

CENTER OF THE AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, COMMUNITY PROGRAMS FOR WOMEN
COST AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 13-21 (1975).
OFFENDERS:

27. There are generally considered to be four plausible purposes
for imprisonment: rehabilitation, retribution, deterrence and incapacitation. This article will not undertake to suggest which of the four
purposes should underlie the decision to release an individual on parole.
Necessarily, the amount of time for incarceration will vary depending
upon the theory adopted. However, it is obvious that if the need to
retain the individual within the institution has actually ceased then
the public has no interest in retention. For a discussion of the four theories see A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 9-55 (1976).
28. Haymes v. Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975); United States
ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff, 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975); Bradford v.
Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1974), vacated as moot, 423 U.S. 147
(1975); Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Mower v. Britton, 504 F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1974); United States
ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of New York State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d
925 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974); Franklin v.
Shields, 399 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Va. 1975); Billiteri v. United States Bd.
of Parole, 385 F. Supp. 1217 (W.D.N.Y. 1974); Cooley v. Sigler, 381 F.
Supp. 441 (D. Minn. 1974); Freeman v. Schoen, 370 F. Supp. 1144 (D.
Minn. 1974); Candarini v. Attorney General, 369 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D.N.Y.
1974); United States ex rel. Harrison v. Pace, 357 F. Supp. 354 (E.D.
Pa. 1973); In re Sturm, 11 Cal. 3d 258, 521 P.2d 97, 113 Cal. Rptr. 361
(1974); Monks v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d
193 (1971); Solari v. Vincent, 46 App. Div. 2d 453, 363 N.Y.S.2d 332
(1975); Cummings v. Regan, 45 App. Div. 2d 222, 357 N.Y.S.2d 260, rev'd
and dismissed as moot, 36 N.Y.2d 969, 373 N.Y.S.2d 563 (1974).

29. See K. DAvIs,

DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE

30. 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.1 et seq. (1975).
31. Pub. L. No. 94-233 (March 15, 1976).

128-29 (1969).
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The parole release decisional process presently consists of
an inmate making a short personal appearance before one or
more members of the parole board at the institution where the
individual is incarcerated.32 These members will interview the
inmate and hear anything which he may have to say on his own
behalf. They may be empowered to make the decision at the
institution, or they may be required to make a recommendation
to the entire parole board or a constituent committee.3 3 At the
time of the inmate's appearance before the board and during the
decisional process, the board has before it, and presumably
refers to, a file containing data on the inmate: his crime, his
institutional behavior, his plans should he be paroled, statements
from the inmate and his family, statements from the sentencing
judge and the prosecuting attorney, statements from the victim
and his family and statements from the general public.3 4 The
32. See V. O'LEARY & J. NUFFIELD, THE ORGANIZATION OF PAROLE
SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES XXiX (1972); S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 633-35 (2d ed. 1973). For an in-depth discussion of the

comparative operational and decisional procedures of four parole boards
see R. DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH, AND
CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE

222-98 (1969).

33. For a state by state analysis of the operation of the parole authorities see V. O'LEARY & J. NUFFIELD, THE ORGANIZATION OF PAROLE
SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES

(1972).

34. The Illinois statute is typical. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-34(d)-(e) (1975) provides in part:
(d) In making its determination of parole, the Board shall consider:
(1) material transmitted to the Department by the clerk of
the committing court, under Section 5-4-1 or Section 5-10 of the
Juvenile Court Act;
(2) the report under Section 3-8-2 or 3-10-2;
(3) a report by the Department and any report by the chief
administrative officer of the institution or facility;
(4) a parole progress report;
(5) a medical and psychological report, if requested by
the Board;
(6) material submitted by the person whose parole is being
considered.
(e) The prosecuting State's Attorney's office shall receive reasonable written notice not less than 15 days prior to the parole hearing and may submit relevant information to the Board for its
consideration....
Frank Austin, in his study of the Illinois Parole and Pardon Board,
found five classes of data present:
The information contained in these files was divided into five
general typologies. This division was based upon:
(a) Criminal History: Within this category we were concerned
with the official documentations of the parole candidate's history of
arrests and/or convictions, the nature of these crimes, and the inmate's previous probationary and/or parole outcomes. The sources
of this data were F.B.I. arrest sheets and police reports.
(b) Instant Offense: This category refers to those factors associated with the crime (which the inmate was convicted of). Such
areas as the (1) nature of the crime, (2) type of sentence received,
(3) plea entered and (4) number of persons involved in the crime
are included. Again, the data recorded is based primarily on police
reports plus documents submitted by the court.
(c) Social-Psychological Characteristics: This category in-
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contents of this file are generally not revealed to the
being considered for parole. 35 After the decision
reached, the inmate is informed of it in a written
which may or may not set forth reasons for the
parole.

36

individual
has been
statement
denial of

Disclosure of File Data

While the hearing or appearance certainly has some effect
on the parole release decision, it appears that the parole decision
is made principally on the basis of the data which is in the
inmate's file.3 7 This is not necessarily inappropriate,3" but the
or misleading
secrecy of the file contents means that inaccurate
39
information may be utilized without challenge.
cluded an array of characteristics ascribed to the parole candidate

based upon psychological, sociological, and psychiatric interviews;

psychometric test results; employment records and correspondence
from family members. All of this information was gathered immediately after the inmate's arrival at the prison.
(d) Institutional Adjustment: This category refers to those
aspects of the inmate's behavior within the institution as recorded
by prison staff. Such factors as the inmate's security status, discipline record, program participation, and time served were felt to be
possibly relevant to Board members in reaching their decisions.
(e) Parole Data: This category included data relating to the
inmate's plans for release from prison such as residence, employment, and special activities such as returning to school, attending a
trade school, or being admitted to a drug abuse program. This data
was secured from the parole report submitted by the professional
staff to the Parole Board.
F. Austin, The Parole and Pardon Board: Decision-Making in the Criminal Justice System, 63-64, September 1974 (unpublished masters thesis
presented to the Graduate School Department of Sociology DePaul
University).
35. The practice is neither statutory nor regulatory, however, the
practice is not inconsistent with the statutes on parole records. See, e.g.,
See S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-5-1 (1975).
CRIMINAL CORRECTION 635 (2d ed. 1973).
36. For one parole authority's rationale for not giving reasons see
K.

DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE

127-29 (1969).

37. The hearings are far too short to develop any meaningful data
upon which the decision could be based. See Cohen, The Discovery of
PrisonReform, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 855 (1972).
38. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 96 S. Ct. 893, 902-08 (1976); Friendly,
"Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PENN. L. REV. 1267, 1287 (1975).
39. Law enforcement records are not always accurate, as is demonstrated in Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974), and United
States v. Mackey, 387 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Nev. 1975). Arrest records may
be poor indicators of criminal propensity and may demonstrate some racial bias, as is illustrated in Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d
1290 (8th Cir. 1975), and Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp.
401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972). Prison records
may contain erroneous or constitutionally impermissible information, as
is shown in Leonard v. Mississippi State Probation & Parole Bd., 509
F.2d 820 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 998 (1975), and Morris v.
United States, 399 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Va. 1975).
It is an essential rule of due process that an individual have an opportunity to comment upon evidence entering into a decision affecting
him. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959); Ohio Bell Tel. Co.
v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937).
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The most traditional notions of procedural due process
include notice of a hearing and an opportunity to rebut damaging evidence. 40 While this is generally achieved through discovery, the use of witnesses and cross-examination, 41 such isnot
always the case. 42 For example, the decision as to the appropriate sentence which should be imposed by the court is made on
the basis of a large quantity of written data.4 3 It is well settled
that due process does not require that this data be developed
through oral testimony, although the courts may use that device
where there is a conflict as to material facts entering into the
sentencing decision. 44 The Supreme Court has also recently
determined that the decision whether to terminate disability
benefits, which is based primarily upon medical opinion, is a
decision made most appropriately on written records rather than
45
oral testimony.
The parole release decision would similarly appear to be a
decision best made upon a written record. Most of the facts
which are brought to the parole authority's attention will not be
contested for their accuracy; convictions, arrests, biographical
and similar data are generally factually accurate, although not
always complete. To require this information to be elicited
through testimony would consume large amounts of time needlessly. Mistakes, however, do occur and records may be incomplete. These can be corrected in writing, provided the inmate
has access to the file sufficiently prior to the decision to permit
him to obtain the appropriate documents to correct the error or
omission and cause them to be added to the file. Irrelevant and
constitutionally impermissible information can be attacked by a
memorandum calling to the attention of the parole board the
fact that it is impermissible, rather than through time-consuming
testimony. Thus, there would seem little to be gained by requiring a hearing with witnesses and cross-examination when just
results can be accomplished by opening the file to the inmate,
giving him an opportunity to add, correct, contest or supplement
the data in writing prior to the parole hearing.46
40. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1967); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S.
385, 394 (1914).
41. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-95, 302 (1973);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S.
474, 496 (1959).
42. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 96 S. Ct. 1551, 1559-60 (1976); Matthews v. Eldridge, 96 S. Ct. 893, 902-03 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974); Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PENN. L.

REV. 1267 (1975).
43. See R. DAWSON,

SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH,
AND CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE 15-99 (1969); S.RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIM-

INAL CORRECTION 81-177 (2d ed. 1973).

44. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
45. Matthews v. Eldridge, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976).
46. However, the parole authority should establish a procedure
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Access to the inmate's file is consistent with generally
accepted principles of due process; specifically, individuals have
the right to know the evidence against them and they should be
afforded an opportunity to refute any information which they
believe to be erroneous. 47 Such disclosure is necessary to ensure
that the parole board's decision is based on the facts as they
exist. Law enforcement agency reports are not always accurate 48 and factual errors in presentence reports and parole files
are not unknown. 49 Improper and inappropriate information
has been found in the data files upon which sentencing and
parole release decisions are made. 50 Thus, disclosure of this
data would seem to be an appropriate procedure to assure the
proper exercise of the parole authority's discretion.
The question whether due process requires the disclosure of
data such as that upon which the parole authority makes its
decision is not new, as it was recently debated with regard to the
disclosure of presentence reports. Those opposing such disclosure advanced three major arguments in support of their position. They felt that disclosure would dry-up sources of informathrough which evidence can be taken in appropriate cases for those few
cases where the disputes of fact will be of considerable magnitude and
it is impossible to reach a decision without resolving these factual conflicts. It is doubtful that this will occur with any frequency.
47. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959); Ohio Bell Tel.
Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 300-05 (1937); United States
v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 1973).
[D]isclosure and comment are essential to our commitment to respect for individual dignity in the criminal process. They insure
that the defendant is treated as a citizen entitled to know what is
happening to him and why and how it is happening-not as a Kafkaesque victim of Star Chamber secret proceedings.
United States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1191 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 950 (1971) (Wright, J., dissenting).
48. See Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Maney v.
Ratcliff, 399 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Wis. 1975); United States v. Mackey,
387 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Nev. 1975).
49. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972); Townsend v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948); Baker v. United States, 388 F.2d 931, 93233 (4th Cir. 1968); Masiello v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 1133 (D. Conn. 1973).
50. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972); Leonard v.
Mississippi State Probation & Parole Bd., 509 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1975);
Shelton v. United States, 497 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Latimer, 415 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir. 1969); Baker v. United States, 388 F.2d
931 (4th Cir. 1968); Billiteri v. United States Bd. of Parole, 385 F. Supp.
1217 (W.D.N.Y. 1974). Cf. United States v. Trice, 412 F.2d 209 (6th Cir.
1969) (error in failing to reveal contents of memorandum handed to the
court by the prosecution at sentencing not reversible error where the
court specifically eschewed reliance upon the contents); United States
v. Stubblefield, 408 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1969) (disparity between sentences
for co-defendants valid where not based upon improper factors); Lingo
v. Stone, 401 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (court troubled by characterization of inmate as violent by parole authority where inmate had
no serious record of violence and the suggestion by the parole authority
that the inmate needed programs where he had actively participated in
all available programs).
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tion, hinder rehabilitation, and inordinately protract the sentencing proceeding by introducing a myriad of factual issues. 51
As to the last point, if the inmate is given access to his file
sufficiently prior to the hearing, the proceedings would not be
prolonged to any great extent. In this way, he would have
sufficient time to amplify, clarify, or rebut any evidence by
means of affidavit, additional official records or other written
means before the hearing commenced. Given the fact that oral
disputes are not permitted in the absence of serious factual
controversy, this process may actually shorten the hearing
process where the file data is clearly negative or clearly positive. 52 Such a policy of limiting the inmate to disputation or
supplementation of the record in writing would seem to accomplish the objective of securing an accurate record while remain53
ing consistent with due process.
The second argument, that disclosure of information would
hinder rehabilitation, was adequately addressed by the drafters
of Rule 32(c) (3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:
(3)

Disclosure.

(A) Before imposing sentence the court shall upon request
permit the defendant, or his counsel if he is so represented, to
read the report of the presentence investigation exclusive of
any recommendation as to sentence, but not to the extent that
in the opinion of the court the report contains diagnostic opinion which might seriously disrupt a program of rehabilitation,
This rule recognizes an exception which, for the purposes of the
parole granting hearing, might be narrowed even further. Release of diagnostic material cannot disrupt a program of rehabilitation unless that program is presently being provided to the
inmate or there is a strong probability that the program will be
provided to the inmate in the immediate future. 54 If a program
of rehabilitation is in progress, the need for confidentiality could
51.

See

NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS

(1973).
52. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976); United States
v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 1973) (the second circuit would
permit oral testimony to rebut data in the presentence report, but obviously preferred reliance upon documents, written statements and affiAND GOALS, CORRECTIONS 188

davits).
53. See Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PENN. L. REV. 1267,
1287 (1975).
54. To permit the utilization of a less narrow exception would permit

the parole authority to employ the exception as a cover for other bases

of denial. Where the individual is not presently receiving treatment and
the institution does not have any facilities for such treatment nor is there
any chance of his being transferred to an institution which does provide
treatment, there seems to be no reason not to permit the individual to
know any diagnostic opinion of him. See also AMERICAN BAR AsS'N,
STANDARDS

RELATING

§ 4.4(b) (1968).

TO

SENTENCING

ALTERNATIVES

AND

PROCEDURES
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be certified by the professional who is examining the inmate and
this certification should be within that portion of the file which
is released to the inmate.
The final argument is that disclosure would tend to dry-up
the sources of information for these reports. Experience in
those states which have mandatory disclosure of presentence
report laws, however, has not demonstrated the accuracy of the
prognostication. 5 Moreover, the individual gathering the information can rarely promise that the sources will be kept confidential.5 6 Thus, where the information is volunteered by individuals in the community, as letters of protest to a proposed parole,
the individuals cannot reasonably expect that this data will not
be made available to the inmate. 57 Where the data is the official
record of a public official there would seem to be no reason for
secrecy.
The debate over whether or not due process required the presentence report to be revealed to the defendant was inclusive.
While the debate was being pressed with vigor, many states and
the federal system adopted rules or statutes mandating or permitting such disclosure. 58 Even before this occurred numerous
courts had found that disclosure was required. 59 Additionally,
courts and commentators considering the question have suggested that the file data be made available to the inmate prior to
55. See AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING
ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 4.4(b)
(1968): NATIONAL. ADVISORY
COMM'N ON

CRIMINAL

JUSTICE STANDARDS

AND

GOALS,

CORRECTIONS

188

(1973).
56. Many states permit release of the presentence report in the discretion of the sentencing judge. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 10053-4(b) (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.03 (Supp. 1972). Thus, the
individual gathering this information cannot accurately represent that
the information gathered will be kept confidential. The presentence report constitutes one of the largest single items of information to be
placed in the record which the parole board considers. See ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-4-1 (d) (1975).
57. The individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Cf. United States v. Miller, 96 S. Ct. 1619 (1976). The Illinois Parole
and Pardon Board would seem to welcome statements from the general
public regarding the granting of parole. See Chicago Tribune, April 11,
1976, § 2, at 8, col. 1.
58. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c) (3): ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 10053-4(b) (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.03 (Supp. 1972).
59. United States v. Miller, 495 F.2d 362 (7th Cir. 1974); State v.
Kunz, 55 N.J. 128, 259 A.2d 895 (1969); Commonwealth v. Phelps, 450
Pa. 597, 301 A.2d 678 (1973). Cf. United States v. Esroinoza, 481 F.2d
553 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1973);
Baker v. United States, 388 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1968). See also AMERICAN
BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES
4.3-4.5 (1968); 10 UNIFORM LAWS ANN., MODEL PENAL CODE

§§
§ 7.07 (Master ed. 1974);
TICE

STANDARDS

JUDGES

OF THE

SENTENCING ACT

AND

NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSCORRECTIONS 188-89
COUNCIL ON CRIME AND

GOALS,

NATIONAL

§ 4 (2d ed. 1972).

(1973); COUNCIL OF
DELINQUENCY, MODEL
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the parole hearing and that he be afforded an opportunity to
comment on such data in writing.0 0
The provision of access to the inmate's file data, prior to
the parole hearing, with the opportunity to amplify, clarify and
rebut its contents in writing prior to the ultimate decision,
provides the inmate with notice of the entire factual basis upon
which the decision is to be made. It provides some assurances
against decisions based upon erroneous or misleading data, but
it does not assure that the decision will be rational or that
irrelevant or impermissible considerations will not enter into the
decision. To provide protection against these occurrences, it is
necessary to require that the paroling authority provide a written
rationale for its decision.
Written Reasons for the Decision
The provision of written reasons for the denial of parole,
when coupled with a disclosure of the inmate's file, tends to limit
the discretion of the parole authority by requiring elucidation of
the specific facts and criteria which are employed in determining
whether to grant parole. 61 Failure to provide reasons for denial
62
It
of parole cannot help but frustrate and embitter the inmate.
is suggested that this failure may be one of the contributing
63
factors of prison disturbances.
60. Franklin v. Shields, 399 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Va. 1975); Cooley
v. Sigler, 381 F. Supp. 441 (D. Minn. 1974); In re Prewitt, 8 Cal. 3d
470, 503 P.2d 1326, 105 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1973); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N
ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS

ORLAND, PRISONS:

AND GOALS,

HOUSES OF DARKNESS

CORRECTIONS

422 (1973); L.

149-50 (1975); S.

RUBIN, THE

LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 635 (2d ed. 1973); Johnson, Federal Parole

Procedures, 25 AD. L. REV. 459, 484-85 (1973); Project-Parole Release
Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 865-66
(1975). Cf. Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1974), vacated
as moot, 96 S. Ct. 347 (1975); Hrynko v. Crawford, 402 F. Supp. 1083

(E.D. Pa. 1975).

61. This necessarily is the objective of infusion of due process into
the parole granting process. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT
93-94, 326-27 (3d ed. 1972).
62. . . . The prisoner then returns to prison routine and awaits the
decision in a state of anguish.
To be denied parole is frustrating. But to be denied parole
without any explanation for the decision is embittering and rancorous.
Because no rationale is given, the prisoner, comparing his case to
that of others who were granted parole, may see the denial as a
capricious decision. He is often at a loss to understand what he has
done wrong or how he can improve his performance. Parole board
silence compounds his cynicism and his hostility to authority.
NATIONAL

COUNCIL

ON

CRIME

AND

DELINQUENCY,

PAROLE

DECISIONS

(1972) (a policy statement approved by the Council's Board of Directors
on Oct. 31, 1972).
63. The report of the Commission appointed to investigate the causes
of the Attica riot is very revealing:
While the board acts favorably in most cases, it engenders hos-

tility because of the inconsistency of its rationale. Some inmates
who have had good behavior records in prison are 'hit' (denied pa-
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Procedural due process has been held to require a written
statement of adequate reasons for a particular action by an
administrative body. 4 The purpose of requiring a written statement specifying the facts upon which the decision is based is to
facilitate review of the decision and to determine whether the
decision-maker has properly exercised his discretion. 5 The
requirement of written reasons for the denial of parole also will
assist the inmate in determining what he must do in order to be
favorably considered for release upon his next appearance. 6
Without disclosing the facts upon which it makes its decision or
stating reasons for its actions, the parole board's decision could
be based upon facts which do not exist, facts which are totally
irrelevant or considerations not permitted by relevant statute or
0 7

constitution.

role), while others with many infractions are granted parole. Some
inmates with a long record of prior offenses may receive parole,
while others, including first offenders, may be denied it. Nobody
gives the inmate an explanation for these obviously inconsistent decisions or describes in anything more than meaningless generalities
the criteria used by the board in arriving at its decisions. Institutional parole officers give inmates pointers on what might subsequently impress the board, such as enrolling in Bible classes. But
inmates who follow this advice carefully often find they are hit
nevertheless. As a result, inmates are left to speculate among themselves as to the reasons for the board's decisions. Corruption and
chance are among the favorite inmate speculations.
ATTICA:

THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMM'N

ON ATTICA 97 (Bantam ed. 1972).
64. S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
65. Id.
66. [T]he provision for a written record [of the decision] helps insure that administrators, faced with possible scrutiny by state officials and the public, and perhaps even the courts, where fundamental
constitutional rights may have been abridged, will act fairly. Without written records, the inmate will be at a severe disadvantage in
propounding his own cause to or defending himself from others...
[W]e perceive no conceivable rehabilitative objective or prospect of
prison disruption that can flow from the requirement of these statements.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565 (1974).
When dealing with administrative agencies generally we have
long pointed to the need for suitable expression of the controlling
findings or reasons. . . . 'not only'in insuring a responsible and just
determination' by the agency but also 'in affording a proper basis
for effective judicial review.'
So here, fairness and rightness clearly dictate the granting of the
prisoner's request for a statement of reasons. That course as a general matter would serve the acknowledged interests of procedural
fairness and would also serve as a suitable and significant discipline
on the Board's exercise of its wide powers. It would in nowise curb
the Board's discretion on the grant or denial of parole nor would
it impair the scope and effect of its expertise.
Monks v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 244-45, 249, 277
A.2d 193, 196, 199 (1971).
67. The failure to state reasons has additional consequences.
Even the most flagrant abuse of discretion is likely to go uncorrected. If a board member is in such a hurry to get to his golf
game that he votes in sixteen cases without looking inside the files,
no one under the board's system can ever know the difference, even
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The parole authorities in the United States are well aware
that an explanation of the basis for denial of parole is appropriate and desirable.68 Indeed, the judiciary has emphasized on
numerous occasions the necessity of such an explanation. 9 Since
Morrissey, several jurisdictions have ruled that procedural due
process applies to parole granting, and the vast majority of these
jurisdictions have determined that written reasons for the denial
70
of parole is at least one element of the required due process.
Obviously, there is a considerable spectrum of statements
which can be deemed to be explanations for parole authority
actions. At one end would be a simple check-list on which the
printed "formula explanation" most relevant to the specific prisoner would be checked. At the other end would be an extensive
recitation of the factors relied upon, the decisional processes
employed, and the rationale for the ultimate decision.
though the personal liberty of sixteen men may be at stake. How
could a board member have less incentive to avoid prejudice or undue haste than by a system in which his decision can never be reviewed and in which no one, not even his colleagues, can ever know
why he voted as he did? Even complete irrationality of a vote can
never be discovered. Should any men, even good men, be unnecessarily trusted with such uncontrolled discretionary power?
K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 128-29 (1969).
68. See O'Leary & Nuffield, Parole Decision-Making Characteristics:
Report of a National Survey, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 651, 658, Table 11 (1972).
69. The seventh circuit has indicated in a nonconstitutional setting
that:
'Giving reasons for denying parole is desirable for both rehabilitational and legal reasons. A prisoner may feel less resentful of
a negative decision if he knows the reasons for it, and in planning
his activities in the institution he ought to understand clearly what
will help him to obtain an early parole. When the nature of his
crime is such that early parole is not likely in any event, he should
be protected from unrealistic hopes that can only lead to disappointment and bitterness. All this is the job of a prison counselor in
any case, but the Parole Board can make that job much easier by
formally stating its reasons.'
King v. United States, 492 F.2d 1337, 1340 n.11 (7th Cir. 1974).
An explanation of the basis for a denial is in accord with the recommendations of the American Bar Association, see AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
SUMMARY OF ACTION AND REPORTS TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES pt. 2, at
133C (1974); the National Advisory Commission, see NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS

AND GOALS,

CORRECTIONS

422

(1973); and the Administrative Conference of the United States, see
Johnson, FederalParole Procedures, 25 AD. L. REV. 459, 484-85 (1973).
70. United States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff, 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir.
1975); Haymes v. Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975); Childs v. United
States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Mower v. Britton,
504 F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman
of New York State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated as
moot, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974); Franklin v. Shields, 399 F. Supp. 309 (W.D.
Va. 1975); Billiteri v. United States Bd. of Parole, 385 F. Supp. 1217
(W.D.N.Y. 1974); Cooley v. Sigler, 381 F. Supp. 441 (D. Minn. 1974);
Candarini v. Attorney General, 369 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); United
States ex rel. Harrison v. Pace, 357 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Pa. 1973); In
re Sturm, 11 Cal. 3d 258, 521 P.2d 97, 113 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1974); Monks
v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d 193 (1971); Cummings v. Regan, 45 App. Div. 2d 222, 357 N.Y.S.2d 260, rev'd and dismissed as moot, 36 N.Y.2d 969, 373 N.Y.S.2d 563 (1974). Contra, Brown
v. Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1976).
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In determining the sufficiency of the written explanation
for a parole denial, it is appropriate to consider once again the
functions served by such a requirement. It is suggested that a
written explanation of the basis for a decision serves at least
three separate, but interrelated, functions. The first is to assure
71
that the parole authority is properly exercising its discretion
and that it does not employ erroneous information or improper
criteria.7 2 The second function is to serve as a guide to the
inmate to improve himself in order that he might be paroled at a
provide a basis for judicial
later date.73 The third function is 7to
4
review of the administrative action.
Sufficiency of the Written Explanation
If the written reasons are to serve these purposes, it is
obvious that a mere check-list will not be sufficient, 5 nor will a
mere recitation of broad criteria such as that frequently established by statute or regulation. 76 General statutory language,
which obviously cannot be tailored to individual fact situations,
would not indicate to the inmate what actions he should undertake to improve his chances for parole. This general language
would not provide a basis for review nor would it provide a
means to determine whether the parole authority has properly
exercised its discretion.
In order for a written explanation to accomplish the three
enumerated purposes it is necessary to provide some factual
71. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565 (1974).

72. See Smith v. North Carolina, 528 F.2d 807 (4th Cir. 1975); Smartt

v. Avery, 370 F.2d 788 (6th Cir. 1967); Billiteri v. United States Bd. of

Parole, 385 F. Supp. 1217 (W.D.N.Y. 1974).
73. King v. United States, 492 F.2d 1337, 1340 n.11 (7th Cir. 1974);
Monks v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 246, 277 A.2d 193,
See R. DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE,
197 (1971).
LENGTH, AND CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE

257-58

(1969).

74. S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943). The Supreme
Court has noted the difficulty inherent in reviewing a decision where
there are no written findings or reasons. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 58
(1967).
75. Speaking of the effectiveness of a checklist, Professor Vincent
O'Leary, Director of the National Parole Institute, indicated that:
Most of the time it would be difficult at best. Most of the time
I think an inmate is asking for more information than that....
[I]t seems to me the more information you can give the inmate,
the more likely you are going to have a salutory effect on him. It

would be difficult for me to see [how] a preordained checklist

would satisfy the kind of information they would need.
Hearings on H.R. 13118 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 15, pt. 7A, at 219-20 (1972). See also
Note, Parole Release-Federal Circuits Conflict on Applicability of Due
Process and Administrative Procedure Act to Parole Release Decisions,
27 VAND. L. REV. 1257 (1974).
76. See Strassi v. Hogan, 395 F. Supp. 141 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Craft
v. Attorney General, 379 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Candarini v. Attorney General, 369 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
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development in addition to a conclusory statement of the reasons
for a decision. This factual development would necessarily have
to be consistent with and supportive of the stated reasons for a
denial of parole. If the stated facts were inaccurate or not
reflective of the totality of the facts available to the board, this
would be known to the inmate through his access to the data file
and could readily be called to the attention of the parole board
upon petition for rehearing or, if necessary, to the judiciary.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has provided an
outline of what is required to constitute an adequate explanation:
To satisfy minimum due process requirements a statement
of reasons should be sufficient to enable a reviewing body to
determine whether parole has been denied for an impermissible
reason or for no reason at all. For this essential purpose, detailed findings of fact are not required, provided the Board's
decision is based upon consideration of all relevant factors and it
furnishes to the inmate both the grounds for the decision (e.g.,
that in its view the prisoner would, if released, probably engage
in criminal activity) and the essential facts upon which the
Board's inferences are based (e.g., the prisoner's long record,
prior experience on parole, lack of a parole plan, lack of employment skills or of prospective employment and housing, and
his drug addiction).77
In several states there are statutes or regulations which establish
guidelines to assist the parole authority in determining whether to
grant parole. Several lower courts have determined that a mere
recitation of the language of these guidelines, without more,
78
does not comport with due process.
The seventh circuit considered the sufficiency of a parole
board's stated reasons in the recent case of United States ex rel.
Richerson v. Wolff. 79 There, the decision denying parole not
only recited the statutory language, "release at this time would
depreciate the seriousness of the offense," but also referred to
the facts of the particular offense upon which it based its conclusion and noted that the institutional record of the individual was
excellent.80
The court held that this recitation satisfied the
standards established by the second circuit in United States ex
81
rel. Johnson v. Chairman of New York Board of Parole,
which
77. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of New York State
Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 934 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 419 U.S. 1015
(1974).
78. Haymes v. Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975); Craft v. Attorney
General, 379 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Candarini v. Attorney General, 369 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), and the cases cited therein at
1137.
79. 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975). See also McGee v. Aaron, 523 F.2d
825 (7th Cir. 1975).
80. 525 F.2d 797, 801 (7th Cir. 1975).
81. 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974).
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the seventh circuit cited with approval.8 2 While the court expressly pretermitted the question whether a mere recitation of
the statutory criteria for granting parole would be sufficient to
satisfy due process, the court's discussion would seem to8 3indicate
that it was assuming a negative position on that question.
The requirement of a written explanation for denial of
parole, setting forth both the rationale and the factual basis of
the decision, coupled with the inmate's access to his file data, goes
far towards assuring the proper exercise of the parole authority's
discretion. Together, they provide much of the control that
procedural due process requires without unnecessarily intruding
into the efficient operation of the parole system. At present,
they appear to be recognized elements of procedural due process
4
in the parole release decisional process .
Establishmentof Criteriafor the Decision
The adoption of established criteria to determine whether
to grant or deny parole is an additional procedural safeguard
which has been suggested by some courts and commentators.
The Supreme Court has strongly suggested that administrative
agencies adopt criteria to guide their decision-making 5 and this
has been echoed by various courts of appeals.8 " As a result,
most statutes establishing parole authorities provide some basic
in determining whether to release the
criteria to assist the board
8 7
individual on parole.
Publication of such criteria serves to guide the decisionmaker in reaching his decision and provides some assurance that
the decision is not arbitrary. At the same time, it provides the
inmate with some indication of what evidence he should present
88
to the board and what he must accomplish to gain his release.
82. 525 F.2d 797, 804 (7th Cir. 1975).
83. Id. at 805.

84. See notes 73 and 83 supra.
85. S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947).

86. See, e.g., White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750, 753-54 (7th Cir. 1976);
Appalachian Power Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 477 F.2d
495 (4th Cir. 1973); Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287, 292 (1st Cir. 1973);
Environmental Defense Fund Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir.
1966). Noncompliance with vague or unknown rules cannot be punished.
Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163, 167 (7th Cir. 1969).

The United States Board of Parole, previously operating without established criteria, had proclaimed publicly that its members had no
knowledge of the reasons or considerations which entered into the votes
of fellow Board members. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 128-29
(1969). This practice has since been terminated and replaced with an
elaborate set of regulations and criteria. See notes 39-40 supra. See
also Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
87. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-5(c) (1975).
88. See K. DAVIS,

ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW TEXT 93-94 (3d ed. 1972).
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However, while such criteria may be adequate to indicate in
general terms the determination which the parole authority must
make, they are generally far too vague to serve as a guide in the
determination whether parole should be granted in any particular situation.8 9
One district court has determined that due process requires
the establishment and publication of written criteria for the
granting of parole. 90
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
however, has held recently that such a safeguard is not required
by due process.9 1 The court reasoned that since due process
requires written reasons for a denial of parole and since these
reasons must demonstrate the criteria and reasoning process for
the decision, such decisions over a period of time would establish
a body of criteria similar to the body of precedent employed by
the courts.9 2 The court ruled that, until this process was found
to be ineffective, it would not require the establishment of such
93
criteria as a matter of constitutional law.
While the establishment and publication of criteria in some
form seems highly desirable, the stare decisis approach seems
workable, if not preferable, to an attempt to develop a full
written set of criteria. The success of this approach depends, of
course, upon the availability of the parole authority's decisions to
prospective parolees.9 4 Without such availability, the individual
89. These statutory criteria speak in terms of broad principles and
do not indicate the weight or relevance to be given any particular factual
item. An example is criterion 1.1 from form 911-912-913-046 of the Ohio
Adult Parole Authority (Aug. 1, 1975) which provides, "there is substantial reason to believe that the inmate will engage in further criminal
conduct, or that the inmate will not conform to such conditions of release as may be established under Administrative Regulation 816." This
broad guideline does not indicate what evidence is to be considered or
how it should be considered. Assuming that the inmate is a first offender, what weight should be given to the nature of the particular
crime? Are there some crimes to which greater attention must be paid?
Does the fact that the individual has a high school education enter into
this decision? What about institutional discipline? What about military
service? Should his mother's recent death be considered? All of these
factors probably have some relevance, but to what degree is not clear.
With 60 years of experience in parole proceedings, it would seem that
considerably more definite factual criteria could be indicated to guide
the parole authority and the inmate, even if it is totally impossible to
construct a rough formula for the determination whether to release on
parole.
90. Franklin v. Shields, 399 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Va. 1975).
91. Haymes v. Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975).
92. Id. at 543-44.
93. Id. at 544.
94. The question whether parole board decisions are available to persons other than the individual being considered for parole has been faced
directly. In National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties
Union Foundation, Inc. v. Sigler, 390 F. Supp. 789 (D.D.C. 1975) the court
held that parole decisions are public records. In Hrynko v. Crawford,
402 F. Supp. 1083 (E.D. Pa. 1975) a Pennsylvania district court stated,
in dicta, that a record of the parole hearing was producible under the

Due Process in Parole Granting

1976]

being considered for parole has no assurance that the decision in
his case is consistent with prior cases and little assurance that his
behavior is in conformity with those standards which the parole
authority has established for the granting of parole.
Forced by judicial construction of the Administrative Procedure Act, the United States Board of Parole recently has
adopted extensive criteria to guide it in determining whether to
grant parole.9 5 While these guidelines and their use by the
Board have been subject to criticism, they do represent a serious
step towards confining the discretion of the paroling authority
without stripping it of its discretionary authority. 96
CONCLUSION

The injection of procedural due process into the parole
release decision is not a panacea for the problem of determining
who should be paroled. It is not a direct response to those
critics who suggest that parole is inherently unfair or unworkable and should be abolished.9 7 The procedures required by due
process, however, will, at the least, provide a considerably more
accurate picture of the workability of the parole system.9 8
While the United States Supreme Court will not consider
the issue until the October, 1976 term, it has given some indications that it will find due process applicable to the parole release
decision. 99 The agreement among the lower federal courts with
Freedom of Information Act. See also Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 405 F. Supp. 8 (E.D. Pa. 1975).

95. Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir.
1974). See note 39 supra.
96. The primary judicial criticism has been that the regulations fail

to take into account different sentencing statutes creating different minimum sentences. See Garafola v. Benson, 505 F.2d 1212 (7th Cir. 1974)
(involving a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 4208 (a) (2) which authorizes immediate eligibility for parole); Kortness v. United States, 514 F.2d 167
(8th Cir. 1975)

(same); Fletcher v. Levi, 18 CRiM. L. RPm. 2441-42

(D.D.C. 1976) (application of regulations to an individual sentenced under the federal Youth Corrections Act held invalid because of lack of
consideration for rehabilitation).
97. See D. FOGEL, WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF (1975); N. MoRRIs, THE

FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); L. ORLAND, PRISONS: HOUSES OF
DARKNESS (1975); E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS (1975); A.

VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976).

98. R. DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH, AND
CONDITIONS (1969), is one of the more complete analyses of parole board

operations.

However, Dawson's descriptive non-statistical approach

misses many operational nuances. Studies, such as Frank Austin's
master's thesis, see note 44 supra, which combine description with supporting statistical data, are not generally available. It is suggested that
this paucity of data is attributable to an unwillingness of parole boards to
open their files to researchers who might be critical of their procedures.
This unwillingness is demonstrated by the fact that Austin was not permitted to utilize the name of the board he was observing, although he
was an employee of the Illinois Department of Corrections at the time
that his thesis was written.

99. One of the factors which entered into the Court's decision in Wolff
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respect to the applicability of due process to the parole release
decision, coupled with almost equal agreement on its constituent
elements, would seem to support such an assessment. 100
Procedural due process is presently being applied to the
parole release decision by the courts. Although the results of
this application cannot be predicted with certainty, it seems
inevitable that one product will be a better understanding of
parole authority operations. Due process will not solve all the
deficiencies of the parole system, but it will bring them into
focus so that they can be dealt with more easily. If the injection
of due process into the parole granting process does nothing
more, it will have admirably served its purpose.

v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), was disciplinary action which had
the effect of lengthening the period of incarceration. The Court held
that this constituted a "grievous loss." It certainly would seem that the
liberty interest inherently affected in the denial of parole is as great.
Presently the Supreme Court has before it Scott v. Kentucky Bd. of Parole, cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3358 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1975) (No. 74-6438),
mootness suggested, 44 U.SL.W. 3416 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1976).
100. See notes 73 and 83 supra.
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